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I. INTRODUCTION
Transfer pricing abuses by transnational corporations' are an
1. The term "transnational corporations" refers to enterprises with either substantive
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important and vexing problem for the governments of less devel-
oped countries. On the one hand, there are strong indications that
less developed countries lose significant amounts of tax revenues
and foreign exchange as a result of transfer pricing abuses. On the
other hand, the introduction of measures to effectively curb trans-
fer pricing abuses may strain the administrative capabilities of all
but the most sophisticated governments of less developed coun-
tries. Efforts to introduce such measures may be met with such
hostility from transnational corporations as to raise serious doubts
about their net impact on the economy: measures that are effective
in curbing transfer pricing abuses may result in additional reve-
nues and save foreign exchange; alternatively they may drive
transnational corporations to other countries where the corpora-
tions have greater discretion in the allocation of income and
expenses.
The principal purpose of this article is to identify what has
been done and to explore what might be done to curb transfer
pricing abuses by transnational enterprises. In furtherance of this
purpose, this section focuses on necessary, but preliminary topics
such as the definitions of transfer pricing and transfer pricing
abuses, their magnitude, and the reasons transnational corpora-
tions engage in transfer pricing abuses. This section concludes with
a discussion of the difficult question of whether it is appropriate or
counter-productive to make extensive efforts to curb transfer pric-
ing abuses in less developed countries. The second section consid-
ers the governmental mechanisms developed to counteract transfer
pricing abuses. The third section deals with the selection and im-
plementation of mechanisms for curbing transfer pricing abuses.
Finally, the fourth section is a conclusion with a summary of the
recommendations.
or formal economic activities in more than one jurisdiction.
It is clear that transnational enterprises are not the only entities that engage in transfer
pricing abuses. There are many instances in which local individuals or companies use trans-
fer pricing to artificially shift profits abroad so as to avoid or evade taxes, circumvent ex-
change controls, or reduce the economic exposure arising from political or economic uncer-
tainties. See generally R. GORDON, TAX HAVENS AND THEIR USE BY UNITED STATES
TAXPAYERS-AN OVERVIEW 59-110 (1981). Nonetheless, transnational corporations are the
logical focus of concerns about transfer pricing abuses, as they are the major actors in for-
eign investment and international trade. In addition, the mechanisms for dealing with trans-
fer pricing abuses by transnational corporations should be equally applicable to transfer
pricing abuses by others. See U.N. CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, SALIENT FEA-
TURES AND TRENDS IN FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT at 8-9, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/14, U.N. Sales
No. 83/IIA/8 (1983).
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A. Definitions: Transfer Pricing and Transfer Pricing
Abuses
The essence of a transfer price is that it is not set by an inde-
pendent transferor and transferee in arm's length negotiations, but
is within the discretion of a single enterprise. Thus, transfer pric-
ing usually refers to the value attached to transfers of goods, ser-
vices, and technology between related entities, such as parent and
subsidiary corporations and brother-sister corporations.2 In addi-
tion, although they are not generally regarded as constituting
transfer prices, the values attached to transfers between unrelated
parties which are controlled by a common entity should constitute
transfer prices. Hence, the values attached to transfers between a
government-owned enterprise which is managed by a transnational
corporation and its affiliates should be regarded as transfer prices.
The establishment of a transfer price is often an imprecise ex-
ercise. As a result, in many cases it is not possible to set a single
figure as the appropriate transfer price: it is much more common
to refer to a range of defensible transfer prices. Thus, transfer pric-
ing abuses occur only when prices are set so that they fall outside
the range of defensible prices.3 The net effect of transfer pricing
abuses is that profits properly attributable to one jurisdiction are
shifted to another jurisdiction. A simple example of a transfer pric-
ing abuse prompted by tax considerations would be a transnational
corporation with a manufacturing subsidiary in West Germany and
a sales subsidiary in Hong Kong. Since the Hong Kong corporate
tax is relatively low, while the German tax is quite high, it would
be in the transnational corporation's interest to set the prices on
transfers between the subsidiaries so that the bulk of the profits
were allocated to the Hong Kong subsidiary. If the transfer price
on goods manufactured by the West German subsidiary and sold
to unrelated parties by the Hong Kong subsidiary were set at or
just slightly above the German subsidiary's production costs, the
effect would be to have all or substantially all of the profits arise in
Hong Kong. If this price were below the range of defensible trans-
fer prices it would constitute an abusive transfer pricing practice.
2. See R. TANG, TRANSFER PRICING PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 2-3
(1979).
3. See Van Hoorn, Jr., Problems, Possibilities and Limitations with Respect to Mea-
sures against International Tax Avoidance and Evasion, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 763
(1978).
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B. Magnitude of Transfer Pricing Abuses in Less Developed
Countries
Empirical evidence on the level of transfer pricing abuses is
far from complete.4 Nonetheless, the evidence that does exist sug-
gests that transfer pricing abuses are a major problem and result in
significant economic damage in both industrialized and less devel-
oped countries. First, because a substantial portion of world trade
is intra-firm, it is clear that transnational corporations have sub-
stantial opportunities to engage in transfer pricing abuses. It is es-
timated, for example, that in 1977 roughly one third of all parent
company exports consisted of intra-firm sales, with the share vary-
ing from forty-five percent for United States enterprises, to thirty
percent for those based in Western Europe, to seventeen percent
for Japanese firms.5 The data for individual less developed coun-
tries emphasize the importance of intra-firm trade and the con-
comitant opportunities for transfer pricing abuses.'
Moreover, the level of intra-firm activity is much higher where
technology and the resultant products are involved. Data on the
earnings from royalties, licensing fees, and technical assistance by
United States and British companies indicate that intra-firm
transactions predominate, accounting for eighty and eighty-five
percent, respectively, of the total earnings of the companies
concerned. 7
The studies that have focused on transfer pricing abuses in
individual countries or within specific industries show that trans-
national corporations are inclined to take advantage of the oppor-
tunities that exist for transfer pricing manipulations. In recent
4. S. PLASSCHAERT, TRANSFER PRICING AND MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 11-12 (1979);
Lall, Transfer Pricing and Developing Countries, 7 WORLD DEV. 60 (1979).
5. U.N. CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN
WORLD DEVELOPMENT-THIRD SURVEY at 160, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/46, U.N. Sales No. 83/11A/
14 (1983)[hereinafter THIRD SURVEY].
6. In Brazil, intra-firm transactions accounted for fifty percent of the imports and sev-
enty-three percent of the exports of U.S. subsidiaries in 1972; U.S. enterprises in Mexico
imported fifty-eight percent of their total imports from their parents and exported eighty-
two percent of the total exports in the same year. Overall, thirty-seven percent of U.S. im-
ports of manufactured goods and seventeen percent of semi-manufactured goods from less
developed countries in 1977 were from related parties. Subsidiaries of British enterprises in
the less developed countries imported approximately twenty-five percent of their recurrent
imports and slightly less than ten percent of their plant and equipment imports from their
parent firms. Similarly, affiliates of West German enterprises operating in Argentina, Brazil,
India and Mexico sold nearly sixty percent of their exports to related companies. Id.
7. Id. at 164-65.
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years, the U.S. Treasury and Congress have become alarmed about
the growing amount of international tax evasion, some of which is
the result of transfer pricing abuses.' A study in Colombia esti-
mated that the weighted average of overpricing for a wide range of
pharmaceutical imports between 1967 and 1970 was 155% of the
arm's length price." Similar studies in Argentina, Mexico, Brazil,
Ethiopia, Tanzania and elsewhere also indicate that transnational
corporations do take advantage of the opportunities to manipulate
transfer prices. 10
Finally, the widespread availability of literature advising busi-
ness enterprises on the intricacies of manipulating transfer prices
also suggests that the practice is quite commonplace." From a gov-
ernmental perspective, the current literature indicates that trans-
fer pricing abuses may be a considerable problem.
It is clear that, to the extent transfer pricing abuses occur,
they result in revenue losses and a drain on foreign exchange
reserves in both industrialized and less developed countries. Fur-
ther, because of the apparent tendency of transnational corpora-
tions to take advantage of the opportunities to manipulate transfer
prices, it is reasonable to conclude that the extent to which trans-
fer pricing abuses are a problem in a particular country is in large
part a function of the level of intra-firm transactions in that coun-
try, the strength of the incentives to engage in transfer pricing
abuses, and the risk such abuses will be detected. It also is logical
to conclude that however great a problem transfer pricing abuses
are in industrialized countries, they are an even greater problem in
the less developed countries because the volume of intra-firm
8. R. GORDON, supra note 1, at 62-63.
9. U.N. CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES at 17 U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/49, U.N.
Sales No. 84/11A/10 (1984) [hereinafter PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY].
10. See id. at 17, 67; INTERCOMPANY TRANSFER PRICING IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE
EXPERIENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY at 4, U.N. Doc. ST/SG/AC.8/L.25
(1977); U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, MAJOR ISSUES ARISING FROM THE
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY: A CASE STUDY OF ETHIOPIA, U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.11/21 (1974);
U.N. DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, TAX TREATIES BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIEs-FIFTH REPORT at 143, U.N. Sales No. E75/XVI/1 (1975); Makani,
The Control of Transfer Pricing and the Related Malpractices in Developing Countries: The
Tanzanian Experience 4-5 (1975) (unpublished manuscript on file in the office of the
author).
11. See S. PLASSCHAERT, supra note 4, at 54; M. GRUNDY, THE WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL
TAX PLANNING 15-22 (1984); R. BENKE & J. EDWARDS, TRANSFER PRICING: TECHNIQUES AND
USES 113 (1980); see generally S. ROBBINS & R. STOBAUGH, MONEY IN THE MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISE: A STUDY OF FINANCIAL POLICY (1973).
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transactions is high worldwide, and the incentives to engage in
transfer pricing abuses are generally greater in the less developed
countries than in the industrialized countries, and the risk of de-
tection usually is less in the less developed countries than in the
industrialized countries.
C. Incentives to Engage in Transfer Pricing Abuses
Transnational corporations engage in transfer pricing abuses
for a variety of reasons. Probably the most widely recognized rea-
son is taxation. For example, if in country A the corporate tax bur-
den is higher than in country B, other factors being equal, an en-
terprise with operations in both countries is logically inclined to
shift profits from country A to country B in order to increase its
after tax-profits. Transfer pricing abuses are especially attractive
to transnational corporations where the tax differentials between
two countries differ greatly, such as is usually the case between
industrialized countries and tax havens, or between less developed
countries and tax havens.
Transfer pricing abuses, however, are prompted by much more
than just corporate income tax differentials. They may be used to
circumvent exchange control restrictions because exchange controls
usually are more liberal for payments for imported capital goods
(and components), services, and technologies than for direct profit
remittances. They also may be used as a device to quietly with-
draw profits in the face of political or economic uncertainties in
host countries or in any instance where business considerations
dictate the showing of low profits in a particular jurisdiction.12
One notable trend in the structure of investments by transna-
tional corporations in less developed countries which undoubtedly
has affected transfer pricing practices has been the movement
away from one hundred percent equity investments. Instead,
transnational corporations increasingly structure their foreign in-
vestments in a package consisting of something less than one hun-
dred percent of the equity, long term debt, technological licenses,
and management services agreements."s This investment strategy
12. S. PLASSCHAERT, supra note 4, at 66; W. Chudson, Notes on Transfer Pricing and Its
Regulation 12 (1978) (unpublished manuscript on file in the office of the author); C. VAITSOS,
INTERCOMPANY INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND TRANSNATIONAL ENTERPRISES 96-108 (1974).
13. See THIRD SURVEY, supra note 5, at 42-43; C. IRISH, INDONESIA: TAXATION OF TRANS-
NATIONAL CORPORATIONS ENGAGED IN NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 2-3 (1983) [hereinaf-
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is usually in response to government policies intended to infuse
some local control over foreign investment. The shift away from
traditional equity investments, however, has coincidentally in-
creased the incentives to withdraw profits through excessive man-
agement fees and royalties for the use of technology, over-invoicing
of imported components, and under-invoicing of exports. Where
there is substantial local participation, profits withdrawn through
transfer pricing abuses still go one hundred percent to the transna-
tional corporation, whereas profits withdrawn through the pay-
ment of dividends are split between the transnational corporation
and the local participants. Thus, profit-oriented transnational cor-
porations, operating in less developed countries with significant lo-
cal participation, are logically inclined to make use of transfer pric-
ing techniques to withdraw profits before they have to be shared
with the local participants.
D. The Impact of Dealing with Transfer Pricing Abuses in
Less Developed Countries
In considering the mechanisms available for reducing transfer
pricing abuses in less developed countries a threshold question
that must be considered is whether the benefits from employing
such mechanisms would outweigh their disadvantages. Unfortu-
nately, this is a close question, and the closeness of the question is
probably a reason many less developed countries have not devoted
more time and resources to curbing transfer pricing abuses.
Transnational corporations have a documented preference for
larger and more affluent markets. This preference is reflected in
the fact that less developed countries accounted for only about
twenty-three percent of total foreign investment inflows between
1978 and 1980.14 Furthermore, just six countries, Argentina, Brazil,
Hong Kong, Malaysia, Mexico, and Singapore consistently ac-
counted for between one-half and three-quarters of the total inflow
into less developed countries during the late 1970's.15 The result is
that the great majority of less developed countries, with their low
per capita GNPs and small markets, account for only a small pro-
portion of the total stock of foreign investment and are relatively
unattractive to the transnational corporations. The less developed
ter C. IRISH, INDONESIA].
14. TMIRD SURVEY, supra note 5, at 17.
15. Id.
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countries with low incomes ' accounted for about sixty percent of
the population of the less developed countries, excepting China
and the other socialist countries of Asia, but they received less
than five percent of the total foreign investment inflows to less de-
veloped countries between 1978 and 1980, compared to fourteen
percent between 1970 and 1972.17
The uncomfortable position of many less developed countries
in their dealings with transnational corporations is further under-
scored by the fact that while they account for a small portion of
the overall activities of the transnational corporations, their pres-
ence in the less developed countries may be highly visible and gen-
erate employment opportunities and foreign exchange earnings of
critical importance to the host economy. Examples of such domi-
nance abound, such as the copper companies in Zambia and Zaire,
mining companies in Botswana, and agricultural enterprises in the
Eastern Caribbean. The overall impact is that many less developed
countries are in a delicate position: if the less developed countries
introduce more effective transfer pricing policies, the transnational
corporations may respond by shifting their investments to other
countries.
In order to introduce more effective transfer pricing policies
without discouraging foreign investment, it appears the poorer less
developed countries will have to do two things. First, in establish-
ing new transfer pricing rules, the less developed countries will
have to insure that the legitimate interests of the transnational
corporations are safeguarded. The less developed countries must
recognize that determining an appropriate transfer price in a great
many intra-firm transactions is a difficult, highly discretionary
matter on which reasonable, objective, and well-informed people
often differ. Given the numerous factors to be considered in estab-
lishing a transfer price, the tax authorities of a less developed
country could reasonably set a transfer price on certain imports at
$100, while the transnational corporation just as reasonably could
set the price at $125, and the home country of the transnational
corporation, also acting reasonably, could set the price at $150. It
is imperative, therefore, that the less developed countries recognize
the wide range of defensible transfer prices in many intra-firm
transactions and develop provisions that are simple to understand
6. The low income/less developed countries include countries with per capita GNPs of
less than $380 in 1979, not including China and the other socialist countries in Asia.
1'7. THIRD Sunvay, supra note 5, at 28.
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and produce predictable results. It is also essential to apply these
transfer pricing mechanisms only where the discrepancy between
the government's figures and the figures of the transnational cor-
poration is substantial and to establish effective procedure to re-
solve threats of double taxation arising out of the application of
the transfer pricing mechanisms.
Second, to compensate for the disincentives that rigorous
transfer pricing rules may have, the less developed countries
should take steps to improve their "investment climate" through
non-fiscal measures.' 8 For example, new transfer pricing rules
would be less likely to receive a hostile reception if they were in-
troduced as part of a general overhaul of the governmental bureau-
cracies which deal with foreign investment. Included as an initial
part of the overhaul might be a streamlining of the procedures the
transnational corporations are required to follow in order to invest
and operate in the country. If the new transfer pricing rules were
also tied to a relaxation of exchange controls and an easing of the
restrictions on importing capital goods (and components), the
overall reaction of the transnational corporations might be a per-
ception that the government is becoming not only generally more
effective, but also more favorably disposed toward private sector
development.
II. IDENTIFYING THE MECHANISMS FOR REDUCING TRANSFER
PRICING ABUSES
Assuming a governmental policy of curbing transfer pricing
abuses exists, it appears that there are three basic ways of dealing
with them: (i) directly, by establishing an arm's length transfer
price; (ii) indirectly, by apportioning overall profits of an enter-
prise and using posted or notional export prices; and (iii) indi-
rectly, by eliminating tax differentials, taxing intra-firm transfer
payments, and placing artificial restrictions on transactions that
are commonly the object of transfer pricing abuses. These three
alternative possibilities are explored below.
18. Non-fiscal measures are stressed because of the acknowledged ineffectiveness of fis-
cal measures to attract and hold foreign investment. For an exhaustive review of this topic,
see K. Yelpaala, The Efficacy of Fiscal Incentives within the Dynamics of the Transnational
Enterprise: The Case of Ghana and Liberia (1985) (unpublished S.J.D. thesis on file in the
office of the author). See also C. IRsH, INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAXATION AND AFRICAN DE-
VELOPING COUNTRIEs 68-73 (1978) [hereinafter C. IRIsH, AFRICAN COUNTRIES].
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A. Directly: Establishment of a Transfer Price
1. Transfer Pricing Guidelines
Transfer pricing abuses can be attacked through a direct audit
aimed at determining an appropriate transfer price. The enormous
difficulties generally associated with establishing anything other
than an arbitrary transfer price," however, have kept most less de-
veloped countries from effectively using the direct audit approach.
For this reason, in the 1970s the United Nations Group of Experts
on Tax Treaties between Developed and Less Developed Countries
devoted considerable attention to formulating guidelines to assist
the less developed countries in establishing transfer prices for sales
of goods, provision of services, and the use of patent rights and
other intangibles.2 0 These guidelines are substantially similar to
the transfer pricing guidelines developed by the OECD, which in
turn were heavily influenced by the procedures used in the United
States and West Germany."
The substantial similarity between the transfer pricing guide-
lines developed for use in both industrialized and less developed
countries correctly suggests that there is little dispute regarding
the theory to be used in determining appropriate transfer prices."
Almost all transfer pricing guidelines are based upon the "arm's
length" approach under which the essential inquiry is what unre-
lated parties, not under common control, would do in similar cir-
cumstances. In other words, the arm's length approach involves an
attempt to establish the price that would prevail in the
marketplace."
A litany of the transfer pricing guidelines is necessary to de-
termine how to deal with transfer pricing manipulations. Although
19. See, e.g., Makani, supra note 10, at 3-8; U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE. TRANSNA-
TIONAL CORPORATIONS, TAX AVOIDANCE AND/OR EVASION SCHEMES AND AVAILABLE METHODS TO
CURB ABUSES 4 (1977) [hereinafter TAX AVOIDANCE SCHEMES].
20. See U.N. DEP'T OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, TAX TREATIES BETWEEN DEVEL-
OPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES-SEVENTH REPORT U.N. Sales No. E78/XVI/1 (1978)
[hereinafter SEVENTH REPORT].
21. Compare Tress. Reg. §§ 1.482-1, -2 (1954), with SEVENTH REPORT AND COMMIrE
ON FISCAL AvPAIRS-TRANSFER PRICING AND TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS U.N. Doe.
OECD2:P946 (1979).
22. See Surrey, Reflections on the Allocation of Income and Expenses among National
Tax Jurisdictions, 10 L. & POL'V INT'L Bus. 409, 414-15 (1978) [hereinafter Allocation of
Income].
23. Id. at 418.
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the transfer pricing guidelines in use in the industrialized countries
are substantially similar to the U.N. guidelines, the latter are the
focus of the discussion that follows because they were expressly
formulated for use by less developed countries.
2. Sales of goods
The U.N. guidelines indicate that various methods might be
used to determine an arm's length 'price with respect to sales of
goods, but three methods in particular have widespread support:
the uncontrolled market price method, the resale price method,
and the cost-plus method."'
Under the uncontrolled market price method, the transfer
price is established by reference to prices paid by independent
third parties for comparable products. In order to ensure that the
transfer price is fairly representative of the marketplace, adjust-
ments may be necessary for such factors as transport costs, minor
differences in the products, servicing obligations, and differences in
quantity. In addition, evidence of comparable prices needs to be
reasonably contemporaneous because of fluctuations in market val-
ues and currency rates.25
The resale price method involves starting with the price at
which the related purchaser (the reseller) resells goods to indepen-
dent third parties and then subtracting an appropriate mark-up
for the reseller. Establishing the appropriate mark-up requires
evaluating the functions that the related party performed in resel-
ling the product. If the reseller does no more than sell the goods
again, only a small mark-up may be justifiable; but if it can be
shown that the reseller takes on full responsibility for advertising,
marketing, and distributing, then a more substantial mark-up
would be appropriate. The mark-up might also be affected by
whether the reseller has the exclusive right to sell the goods in a
particular market, although the value of the exclusive right may
not be very great.2 6
The cost-plus method involves establishing the seller's costs
and then adding an appropriate mark-up. The considerations in
determining a mark-up are basically the same as are involved with
24. SEVENTH REPor, supra note 20, at 29.
25. Id. at 30-31.
26. Id. at 31-32.
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the resale price method. Establishing the seller's cost requires an
analysis of the various expenses incurred in the production and
sale of the goods to ensure that only expenses properly allocable to
the seller are included in the seller's cost. Thus, expenses such as
transportation, start-up advertising, and overhead need to be ex-
amined to determine the extent to which the expenses benefit the
seller and were properly included in the seller's cost.2
7
As between the three methods, the prevailing view is that the
transfer price established under the uncontrolled market price
method generally comes closest to the actual price in the market-
place. As between the latter two methods, the general view is that
the resale price method is preferable to the cost-plus method in
that it is most likely to approximate the marketplace. The resale
price method relies on two figures, the price at which the goods are
resold by the related purchaser and the reseller's mark-up. The
former figure is fixed by the open market, while the latter figure is
dependent on the tax authority's estimate of the value of the func-
tions performed by the reseller. The cost-plus method also relies
on two figures: the seller's cost and the seller's mark-up; however,
neither of these figures is fixed in the open market. Instead, the
figures are based upon the tax authority's estimates of the proper
allocation of expenses and the value of the functions performed by
the seller. In addition, where imports are involved, the related pur-
chaser is within the jurisdiction of the tax administration and the
seller is located in a foreign country. Therefore, the information
necessary to establish an arm's length price under the resale price
method is easier to obtain and verify than with the cost-plus
method.2 8
3. Services
To establish a transfer price for services rendered by a parent
to a subsidiary or vice versa, the U.N. guidelines stress that it first
is necessary to analyze the nature of the services to determine if
they are properly chargeable. If the services are for the specific
benefit of a subsidiary, however, it is generally agreed that a charge
for such services should be deductible by the subsidiary. Examples
of services performed specifically for the benefit of a subsidiary in-
clude the following: special marketing surveys, financing studies,
27. Id. at 32-33.
28. Id. at 30.
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advertising related to the subsidiary's business, employee training
services, and special legal and management consultant services.
Conversely, if the services performed by the parent relate to its
position as a shareholder of the subsidiary, the expenses involved
seem properly attributable to the parent and should not be de-
ductible by the subsidiary. 9
Of course, there exists a class of services that falls in-between
services performed directly for the subsidiary and services related
to the parent's position as a shareholder of the subsidiary. These
include a wide variety of services such as centralized planning in
the fields of finance, investment, production, marketing, joint ad-
vertising or market research, consolidated accounting and central-
ized public relations. The U.N. guidelines point out that classifying
these types of services is not an easy task, but they suggest that a
useful indication might be whether the services would have been
provided were the parties independent.3 0
Assuming the services are of the type that should benefit the
subsidiary, the tax authority in the country of the subsidiary still
must determine whether charges for the services were imposed on
the subsidiary merely as a means of withdrawing profits from it. It
also is necessary to make certain that the subsidiary has not been
doubly charged for the services: once through a separate charge
and again in the price of goods sold to the subsidiary.31
Having determined that the services were actually for the ben-
efit of the subsidiary, the next step is to establish the proper
charge for such services. Here again the goal is the price charged in
the marketplace, an arm's length price. In the case of commercial
and technical assistance provided directly to the subsidiary, it
sometimes is possible to establish an arm's length charge by refer-
ence to prices charged between independent parties for similar ser-
vices. In many cases, however, it is impossible to find an appro-
priate open market transaction with which to compare the services
in question. In such instances, it is necessary to determine the to-
tal costs of providing the services including both direct costs, such
as the expenses specifically attributable to the services, and indi-
rect costs, such as management expenses, financial charges, adver-
tising expenses and some portion of general administrative ex-
29. Id. at 41-42.
30. Id. at 42-43.
31. Id. at 43.
32. Id.
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penses. After having ascertained the costs attributable to the
services, the taxing authority in the country of the subsidiary then
has to consider whether the proper charge should include only
costs or costs plus a profit. The prevailing view is that a profit
mark-up is appropriate where the services formed an integral part
of the business of the parent, but not where the services were an-
cillary to the parent's main business.33
4. Patent Rights and Other Intangibles
The U.N. guidelines recognize that there are two general
methods by which compensation for intra-firm transfers of patents
and other intangibles are paid. 4 Under the first method, the right
to use the patent or intangible property is transferred in exchange
for a lump sum with a royalty based on gross revenues, production,
or a similar base being given in addition to, or instead of the lump
sum. A second method, commonly used by transnational corpora-
tions, is the "cost-sharing" arrangement, under which the costs of
research and development are shared among related companies
around the world.
Where the first method is used, the U.N. guidelines suggest
that the taxing authority in the country of the licensee make cer-
tain that a real benefit has inured or is inuring to the licensee,
before allowing a deduction for payments by the licensee. The
guidelines indicate that in making this determination the licensing
agreement and other relevant documents should be examined; but
the guidelines also stress the importance of basing the determina-
tion on the substance of the licensing arrangement, rather than
just its formal characterization by the related parties.35
Assuming that a licensing agreement is beneficial to the licen-
see, the next step is to calculate the proper charge for that benefit.
As with income from the sale of goods and services, the ideal
charge for use of patents and other intangibles should be deter-
mined under the arm's length approach. In some cases, an arm's
length charge can be determined by looking to license agreements
that the same licensor has concluded with unrelated parties involv-
ing the same or similar intangible property under the same or simi-
lar market conditions. Alternatively, offers to unrelated parties or
33. Id. at 43-45.
34. Id. at 35-36.
35. Id. at 36.
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genuine bids from competing licensees could be useful if such of-
fers or bids exist. Also, the charge established between unrelated
parties for similar transactions under similar circumstances could
be a guide."'
The U.N. guidelines recognize, however, that in many cases it
is not possible to find satisfactory open-market transactions with
which to compare the intra-firm transfer. In such instances, all rel-
evant factors, such as prevailing royalty rates, nature of the patent
or other intangible, prospective profits of the licensee, and the
costs of the licensor should be considered.3 7 The guidelines men-
tion that an appraisal of the prospective profits of the licensee has
been a factor often considered in actual practice. The guidelines
also point out that costs of licensor may not be a reliable indicator
of the proper charge for the patent or other technology. Any refer-
ence to the licensor's cost is made difficult by the uncertainties of
an eventual return on research and development expenses, the un-
certain length of time during which a patent or other intangible
might be commercially useful and the difficulties of accurately esti-
mating such costs.38
Where cost-sharing method is used, an inquiry must first be
made to determine if the research and development was actually
carried on in the interest of and for the benefit of the local enter-
prise. This can only be done by examining the formal terms gov-
erning the cost-sharing arrangement and the actual substance of
the research and development activity. The next problem would be
to determine the appropriate amount of costs to be shared. The
U.N. guidelines indicate that indirect as well as direct costs might
be properly included in a cost-sharing arrangement. A related
question is whether a cost-sharing arrangement should include a
profit mark-up. The U.N. guidelines indicate there are differing
opinions, but suggest that there is widespread support for a profit
mark-up where the research and development activities are carried
out on special order.3 A third problem is to determine whether the
cost sharing formula is fair and equitable. Here, the U.N. guide-
lines indicate that no formula can be universally applied. They
suggest that methods such as allocating costs on the basis of antici-
pated benefits or the proportionate turnover of the participants in
36. Id. at 37.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 37-38.
39. Id. at 38-40.
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the cost-sharing arrangement might be appropriate in some cir-
cumstances. The guidelines caution, however, that the allocation
formula should be closely examined in all cases.
B. Indirectly: Apportionment of Overall Profits and Posted
or Notional Export Prices
1. Apportionment of Overall Profits
An alternative to the arm's length approach is an apportion-
ment of the overall profits of an enterprise. The object of the ap-
portionment method is not to determine a market price for an in-
tra-firm transaction, but instead to establish a fair or proper
division of the global profits of an enterprise without regard for
how the marketplace would operate.4
Under the apportionment method, a portion of the overall
profits of an enterprise is allocated to a country or state under a
formula designed to measure the substantiality of the connection
between the enterprise and the country or state relative to the en-
terprise's other activities. All forty-five of the individual states in
the United States that tax corporate income, for example, use
some sort of an apportionment formula to determine the income of
multijurisdictional enterprises properly attributable to their
state.4 ' A few of the states apportion profits under a formula that
averages the three ratios of local sales, assets, and labor costs to
their worldwide equivalents.4 2
40. Id. at 34; See Tannenwald, The Pros and Cons of Worldwide Unitary Taxation,
TAX NOTES. Nov. 12, 1984, at 649-50.
41. Id. at 650.
42. Id. at 653. California and Alaska are the most prominent examples of states using
these "worldwide combinations."
In an international context, an apportionment formula using only sales and labor costs
would work as follows:
Suppose a transnational firm has a worldwide profit of 100. Assume its worldwide payroll is
800 and its worldwide sales are 2000. Also assume that the payroll and sales in country A
are 200 and 100, respectively. If the apportionment formula gives twice as much weight to
payroll as to sales, the computation of the overall proportion is determined as follows: 200/
800 for payroll, plus another 200/800 for payroll (because payroll is given twice as much
weight as sales), plus 100/2000 for sales. This adds up to 11/20 and, to get an average pro-
portion from this figure, it is divided by 3 (the number of fractions added together). This
yields an average proportion of 11/60, which is the ratio applied to the overall profits of 100
to determine the amount of that profit (18.33) allocated to country A. THE IMPACT OF
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS ON DEVELOPMENT AND ON INTERNATIONAL RELA-
TIONs-TECHNICAL PAPERS: TAXATION at 34, U.N. Sales No. E74/IIA/5 (1974) (hereinafter
TECHNICAL PAPERS].
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2. Posted or Notional Export Prices
Another alternative to the arm's length approach involves the
use of posted or notional export prices for exports of primary com-
modities. With such prices, the basic principle is to fix the notional
price as a fraction of the price of a downstream product for which
an established market price exists.4 3 Hence, posted or notional
prices are similar to the apportionment method in the sense that
they are used to attribute to the exporting country a predeter-
mined portion of the total value of the finished goods for which the
primary commodities are exported. They are also similar to the re-
sale price method of establishing an arm's length transfer price, in
that the value attributable to the exporting country is determined
by reference to the price at which the primary commodity is resold
after some processing of the commodity has taken place.
Posted or notional export prices are already in use in some
countries to avoid the need of establishing an arm's length transfer
price. This method has been applied in the case of exports of crude
petroleum by integrated international oil companies and with the
export of bauxite where the notional export price has been set as a
fixed proportion of the market price of aluminum ingot." Varia-
tions on notional pricing also have been used to determine the
proper cost of intermediate chemicals in pharmaceutical manufac-
turing and to impute income to purchasing and export activities.
45
C. Indirectly: Elimination of Tax Differentials, Taxation of
Intra-Firm Transfer Payments, and Artificial Restrictions on In-
tra-Firm Transfer Payments
1. Elimination of Tax Differentials
Transfer pricing abuses often are prompted by the combina-
tion of tax differentials (different effective tax rates, for example),
the structure of domestic tax systems (which permits transnational
enterprises to take advantage of tax differentials by deferring taxes
on foreign source profits of foreign subsidiaries until the profits are
distributed to the parent) and the natural desire of profit moti-
vated business people to maximize after tax profits by minimizing
43. See W. Chudson, supra note 12, at 10-12.
44. Id.
45. PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, supra note 9, at 20; U.S.-Argentina Income Tax Treaty,
1 FED. TAx TREATIES 13, 103 (P-H 1986)(not yet in effect).
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their tax liability. If there were a globally uniform income tax rate,
tax avoidance through transfer pricing would decline since there
would be no tax reason to shift profits from one jurisdiction to an-
other. With a globally uniform tax rate, profits would be subjected
to the same tax rate wherever they are realized.
Of course, the existence of low tax or no tax countries whose
present prosperity is largely attributed to their tax haven status
makes it unrealistic to seriously suggest standardization of income
tax rates even within the Western world. Tax differentials are the
life blood of the tax haven countries, so they are not likely to will-
ingly agree to their elimination."'
There is, however, a way to reduce or eliminate the attractive-
ness of tax differentials without the concurrence of tax haven
countries. Since there are no universally acceptable rules on the
outer limits of tax jurisdiction, the attractiveness of tax differen-
tials could be largely eliminated by the home countries of transna-
tional enterprises by extending their tax jurisdiction to include all
profits of transnational enterprises, wherever such profits arose,
and irrespective of whether they were earned by a branch or a sep-
arately incorporated foreign subsidiary. Such a change in the tax
laws of the home countries of transnational enterprises would
mean that all profits of the enterprises, including profits attributa-
ble to foreign subsidiaries arising in tax haven jurisdictions, would
be currently taxed in the home country regardless of whether the
profits are actually distributed to the parent. In order to avoid
double taxation of such profits, however, the home country would
have to offer a tax credit for foreign taxes paid by foreign subsidi-
aries as well as for those paid by the parent company.
A growing number of industrialized countries already do have
specific provisions that tax certain foreign source profits of foreign
subsidiaries. These provisions were introduced for the express pur-
pose of curbing the use of tax haven countries for the accumulation
of profits. The United States, for example, taxes U.S. shareholders
of controlled foreign corporations on certain foreign source profits,
regardless of whether foreign profits are repatriated. 7 As is gener-
ally true in other industiralized countries with anti-tax haven legis-
lation, the U.S. provisions are intended to apply to profits diverted
to or lodged in tax haven countries while leaving foreign operating
46. See generally Irish, Tax Havens, 15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 449 (1982).
47. I.R.C. §§ 951-964 (1982).
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profits untaxed."
2. Taxation of Intra-Firm Transfer Payments
As indicated above, the existence of tax differentials is a major
reason for transfer pricing abuses. To take advantage of tax differ-
entials, however, amounts shifted out of a high tax country to a
low tax country must avoid the high taxes in the former. This
means that the intra-firm transfers must be structured so that they
are deductible by the payor in the high tax country, and are not
taxed to the payee or else are taxed at a relatively low rate. In
other words, tax differentials can be taken advantage of only so
long as the high tax countries impose no or low taxes on certain
remittances and the transnational enterprises are able to charac-
terize their transfers as such remittances. Therefore, it would ap-
pear that countries could combat transfer pricing abuses by impos-
ing some form of taxation on intra-firm transfer payments. The
greater the amount of such payments, the higher the tax.
To some extent, many less developed countries already use
this practice because ad valorem customs duties do operate as a
tax disincentive to engage in transfer pricing abuses through the
over-invoicing of imports. In reality, the decision to artificially in-
flate the price of goods sold needs to take into account not only the
income tax differential between the exporting country and the im-
porting country, but also the ad valorem tariff rate in the import-
ing country and export taxes of subsidies in the exporting country.
It is only when the netting of all these taxes results in a favorable
tax differential that artificial inflation of the price of goods sold
will produce a positive tax benefit.
Of course, because tariffs on intermediate and capital goods
generally are kept very low in less developed countries as a matter
of industrial policy, they often are not a significant factor in intra-
firm pricing decisions. Thus, transnational enterprises are able to
artificially inflate the prices of such goods without attracting corre-
spondingly higher import duties.
48. P. MCDANIEL & H. AULT, INTRODUCTION TO UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TAXATION
118 (1981). West Germany, Japan, Canada, Australia, France and the United Kingdom also
have similar provisions aimed at curbing the use of tax havens. See generally INTERNATIONAL
FIscAL ASSOCIATION, RECOURSE TO TAX HAVENS-USE AND ABUSE: ANTI-TAx HAVEN LEGISLA-
TION (Sept. 18, 1980); PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 71
(1984).
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Apart from the use of customs duties, transfer pricing abuses
could be discouraged by taxing the profit element in intra-firm
transfer payments. Sales of goods, provision of services, and the
licensing of technology are the principal vehicles for transfer pric-
ing abuses; therefore the profit element in these transactions
should be taxed. In theory, the most effective policy would be to
tax all intra-firm transactions; in practice, however, it may only be
possible to impose withholding taxes on essentially passive remit-
tances, and a net income tax on profits attributable to a permanent
establishment.49
The idea of taxing intra-firm transfer payments is not new. In
fact, most less developed countries already have legislation aimed
at taxing royalty payments, income attributable to services per-
formed within the host country over a relatively long period of
time, and income from the sale of goods if the sales are attributa-
ble to a "permanent establishment" in the host country."0 To the
extent these taxes are actually collected, these transactions become
less attractive as vehicles for artificially shifting profits out of the
host country.
Of course, unless the tax rates on the intra-firm payments are
equal to or in excess of the generally applicable corporate tax, a
condition that rarely exists, such payments continue to offer some
opportunity to take advantage of tax differentials. In addition, as
these taxes are presently structured or administered, many intra-
firm transfers actually go untaxed. In the case of royalties and in-
terest payments, for example, the relevant double taxation treaty
sometimes either exempts such payments from source taxation or
else limits the source taxes to a small percentage of the gross.5 '
Alternatively, the transnational enterprise may have intra-firm
payments exempted from host country taxes in an ad hoc agree-
ment between it and the host country.52 In the case of service in-
come, many countries do not impose their tax unless the persons
performing the services are physically present in the country for a
substantial period of time or the services are attributable to a
"fixed base."'5 3 In other instances, service income also may be ex-
49. C. IRISH, AFRICAN COUNTRIES, supra note 18, at 74-81.
50. See M. GRUNDY, supra note 11, at 15; PRICE WATERHOUSE, CORPORATE TAXES
WORLDWIDE-1985 SURVEY (1985)[hereinafter CORPORATE TAXES].
51. For example, many of the tax treaties to which the Netherlands is a party have low
or no withholding tax rates.
52. See C. IRISH, AFRICAN COUNTRIES, supra note 18, at 49-52.
53. See Surrey, United Nations Group of Experts and the Guidelines for Tax Treaties
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empted under an ad hoc agreement between the transnational en-
terprise and the source country. Finally, with respect to the sale of
goods, since most host countries limit their taxes to those sales at-
tributable to "permanent establishments" within their territory,
sales arranged and executed outside the host country usually are
not taxed even though the goods are imported into the host coun-
try."Of course, if the intra-firm payments are not deductible to the
payer, then the importance of taxing such payments as a disincen-
tive to engage in transfer pricing abuses is markedly diminished.
The net impact of denying deductibility is that the amount of the
intra-firm payment is subject to the regular corporate tax in the
country in which the payor is a resident. In Indonesia and Brazil,
for example, interest and royalty payments to affiliated enterprises
may be non-deductible unless the payor establishes that the pay-
ments are consistent with normal commercial practices.5
3. Artificial Restrictions on Transactions Commonly the Object of
Pricing Abuses
An aggressive, but seemingly effective way of dealing with
transfer pricing abuses is to simply prohibit intra-firm transactions
that are likely candidates for transfer pricing abuses. Brazil, for
example, has a very restrictive policy with respect to the payment
of royalties and service fees to related enterprises. Such payments
are generally limited to between one and five percent of gross sales,
depending on how critical the product is to the Brazilian economy.
In addition, whatever payments are made to related enterprises
may not be deductible by the payor, but instead may be treated as
profit remittances and taxed as dividends.56 Indonesia also has
guidelines that specify the maximum royalty for sophisticated
technology as being two percent of net sales for a period of five
years."7
The advent of new forms of host country participation in the
petroleum and mining industries also has reduced the importance
between Developed and Developing Countries, 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 15-16 (1978) [hereinaf-
ter Group of Experts].
54. Id. at 11-14.
55. C. IRISH, INDONESIA, supra note 13, at 16-17; C. IRISH, BRAZIL: TAXATION OP TRANS-
NATIONAL CORPORATIONS ENGAGED IN NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 21 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter C. IRISH, BRAZIL].
56. C. IRISH, BRAZIL, supra note 55, at 5.
57. C. IRISH, INDONESIA, supra note 13, at 4.
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of transfer pricing in connection with the export of primary prod-
ucts. Under production sharing agreements in Indonesia and Ma-
laysia, for example, the issue of transfer pricing is not important
since the host government takes its share of the profits by acquir-
ing the commodity itself."
II. SELECTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF APPROPRIATE
MECHANISMS FOR CURBING TRANSFER PRICING ABUSES
Part II identified the three principal ways to curb transfer
pricing abuses. The problem to be considered in this part is how to
select and then implement the appropriate mechanisms in specific
instances.
At the outset, it should be borne in mind that the selection
and implementation of the appropriate mechanisms to curb trans-
fer pricing abuses should be governed by two overriding and some-
times competing considerations. The first, obvious concern of pol-
icy makers and tax administrators is that the mechanisms
employed be effective in curbing transfer pricing abuses. The fre-
quent lack of adequate resources and trained personnel in tax ad-
ministrations within the less developed countries requires that the
mechanisms be relatively easy to understand and simple to admin-
ister. The second concern is the sometimes overlooked considera-
tion of protecting the legitimate interests of transnational enter-
prises. This means that the mechanisms should not have a chilling
effect on normal, legitimate international business and investment
transactions. In addition, the mechanisms should not be overly
cumbersome and should be structured so as to yield relatively pre-
dictable results. Also, in recognition of the inexactitude inherent in
the transfer pricing process, the mechanisms should not presume
an evil intent and should require adjustments only where there is a
substantial gap between the taxpayers price or profit and the price
or profit determined by the tax administration. With these two
overriding considerations in mind, we now turn to a discussion of
selection and implementation of appropriate mechanisms to curb
transfer pricing abuses.
58. W. Chudson, supra note 12, at 10.
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A. Directly: The Arm's Length Approach
1. Selection
The arm's length approach would seem to be the least contro-
versial mechanism for establishing a transfer price because it at-
tempts to approximate the market. There appears to be substan-
tial agreement within transnational enterprises and the tax
administrations of home and host countries that the ideal against
which intra-firm transfers should be tested is the open market. As
a result, the arm's length approach probably should be used as the
preferred mechanism for curbing transfer pricing abuses. 9
The arm's length approach is clearly feasible in those in-
stances in which the items transferred within a firm are also the
objects of frequent trade in the open market. In such instances, the
open market price provides a ready reference for establishing the
intra-firm transfer price. Thus, the arm's length approach probably
could be readily used with respect to a large proportion of the in-
tra-firm transfers of finished goods because of the general availa-
bility of open market prices for sales of finished goods."
The arm's length approach could also be used with respect to
many intra-firm transfers of intermediate and capital goods. In
such cases, however, use of the arm's length approach would be
more difficult because of the frequent absence of comparable trans-
fers in the open market. Without the luxury of comparison, estab-
lishing an arm's length price becomes a more tenuous process that
requires estimation of the value of the functions performed by a
reseller of goods (under the resale price method for determining an
arm's length price) or the seller's costs and mark-up (under the
cost-plus method). These are items on which reasonable people,
acting fairly and objectively, can differ tremendously."' Further-
more, the task of formulating the estimates often is very difficult
and time consuming. Even the United States Internal Revenue
Service (IRS), with its considerable sophistication and relatively
long experience with the arm's length approach, reports only
mixed success. In the last decade, there have been at least six stud-
ies undertaken to measure the effectiveness of IRS's procedures for
59. Allocation of income, supra note 22, at 414-15.
60. W. Chudson, supra note 12, at 5-6.
61. PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, supra note 9, at 20; Tannenwald, supra note 40, at 650;
S. PLASSCHAERT, supra note 4, at 9-10.
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establishing an arm's length price. The studies generally have been
critical of the low level of success in applying the procedures. One
study suggested that only three percent of the transfer pricing ad-
justments were based on a true arm's length price.2 Even the most
optimistic study, undertaken by the IRS itself, found that a true
arm's length price was established in only twenty-one percent of
the transfer pricing adjustments. 3 Some people within the IRS
have said that the "U.S. experience has demonstrated that, even
with detailed guidelines, the safe haven rules, and substantial dis-
closure requirements, an arm's length profit margin or mark-up is
still often an elusive phantom." 4 A Court of Claims case also gives
some indication of the difficulties involved in using the arm's
length approach:
[A]s evidenced by the magnitude of the record compiled in
this case, the resolution by trial of a reallocation controversy
under section 482 [using the arm's length approach] can be very
burdensome, time-consuming and obviously expensive pro-
cess-especially if the stakes are high. A more manageable and
expeditious means of resolution should be found." '
Exports of primary products also could be checked fairly easily
under the arm's length approach where there are established world
markets for the products. Transfer pricing abuses with respect to
exports of refined copper, for example, would be easily detectable
because of the established and well-publicized open market price
for refined copper. On the other hand, where exports of primary
products are made largely within vertically integrated transna-
tional enterprises, an established open market price may not be
ascertainable. In such cases, and especially where the primary
products represent an important source of export earnings, the use
of the resale price method (often not applicable because of sub-
stantial downstream processing) or the cost-plus method to esti-
mate an arm's length price may be less desirable than other alter-
natives (i.e., the use of formula apportionment or posted or
notional export prices).6 6 On balance, therefore, the arm's length
62. REPORT TO Assoc. COMMISSIONER, IRS EXAMINATION DATA REVEAL AN EFFECTIVE AD-
MINISTRATION OF 482 REGULATIONS 6 (1984).
63. Id.
64. TAX AVOIDANCE SCHEMES, supra note 19, at 4.
65. E.I. du Pont De Nemours v. United States, 78-1 USTC para. 9374 (U.S. Ct. C1.
1978).
66. SEVENTH REPORT, supra note 20, at 34-35.
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approach probably should be looked to as the preferred method of
detecting transfer pricing abuses with respect to intra-firm trans-
fers of goods. Where open market prices for comparable commodi-
ties exist, use of the arm's length approach generally should yield a
relatively non-controversial transfer price. Tax administrators
should at least make an effort to use the resale price or cost-plus
method in instances in which open market sales of comparable
commodities are not available because their widespread acceptabil-
ity should minimize disputes arising from the audit procedures. It
should be recognized, however, that there comes a point at which
the difficulties in establishing a transfer price through use of the
arm's length approach outweigh whatever advantages may be
gained through using widely accepted procedures. The determina-
tion of that point will depend on such factors as the number and
sophistication of the personnel assigned to curbing transfer pricing
abuses and the amount of information available to them. When
that point is reached, however, tax administrators should be pre-
pared to shift to other, possibly more controversial alternatives.
In contrast, the arm's length approach usually is not practical
where services and intangibles are involved. Where comparable
transfers exist in the open market, the arm's length approach can
be used to check intra-firm transfers of services and intangibles.
Most services and intangibles are somewhat unique, however, and
it is only in infrequently that the transfer price can be determined
by reference to comparable transfers in the open market.6 7 As a
consequence, in most cases involving services and intangibles, the
arm's length price is determined in a time consuming process that
involves analysis of the nature of the services and intangibles to
determine whether they are of benefit to the recipient, determina-
tion of the direct and indirect costs properly attributable to the
services, estimating a proper mark up in some cases, and then con-
sidering all other relevant circumstances.' This process is so diffi-
cult, time consuming, and yields such an imprecise transfer price
that most tax administrators would be better off using an alternate
method."9
67. Id. at 43-44.
68. Id. at 35-45.
69. It is precisely the unworkability of the arm's length standard that has led tax ad-
ministrators within the individual states of the United States to use formula apportionment
to determine the tax base of multijurisdictional corporations. See Tannenwald, supra note
40, at 650.
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It is not just the difficulty of the process or the arbitrariness of
the result that dictates use of an alternative to curb transfer pric-
ing abuse. Where goods are involved, tax administrators have a
tangible starting point: the goods themselves. With services and in-
tangibles, however, tax administrators have nothing concrete to use
as the base for their investigation. Instead, where comparable open
market transfers are not available, practically all the information
necessary to estimate an arm's length price for services and in-
tangibles must come directly or indirectly from the transnational
enterprise itself.70 The difficulty of the process and the arbitrari-
ness of result have led to a practice of establishing the transfer
price for services and intangibles through negotiations between tax
administrators and transnational enterprises as opposed to appli-
cation of the arm's length guidelines.7 ' The pertinent information,
however, is primarily within the control of the transnational enter-
prise, so the tax administrators are at a negotiating disadvantage
even without considering the relative negotiating skills and bar-
gaining power of the negotiators.
As a consequence, it appears that in many instances, the arm's
length approach is not suitable for use with respect to intra-firm
transfers of services and intangibles. If comparable open market
prices exist, the tax administration is extremely sophisticated and
well informed, or the tax administration possesses sufficient bar-
gaining power and negotiating skills to reach a reasonable solution,
then the arm's length approach might be appropriate. In most
cases, however, the difficulties of estimating an arm's length price,
the imprecision of any estimate once it is obtained and the tax
administration's frequent lack of bargaining power relative to
transnational enterprises are positive reasons why most tax admin-
istrators should not rely on the arm's length approach to curb
transfer pricing abuses with respect to services and intangibles. At
a minimum, where comparable open market transfers are not
available, tax administrators should not rely exclusively on the
arm's length approach, but instead should employ other alterna-
tives as well.
70. See R. GORDON, supra note 1, at 180; see generally U.N. TAX TREATIES BETWEEN
DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES-SIXTH REPORT U.N. Doc. E76/XVI/3 (1976)[here-
inafter SIXTH REPORT].
71. W. Chudson, supra note 12, at 14; S. PLASSCHAERT, supra note 4, at 79; Lall, supra
note 4, at 68.
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2. Implementation
We concluded above that exclusive reliance on the arm's
length approach to curb transfer pricing abuses is usually only ap-
propriate with respect to transfers of goods. Therefore, we will now
focus on the implementation of the arm's length approach with re-
spect to transfers of goods.
Implementation of the arm's length approach in a way that
curbs transfer pricing abuses and also pays sufficient attention to
the legitimate interests of transnational enterprises requires (i) a
broad system for monitoring intra-firm commodity transactions,
(ii) a relatively simplified audit procedure that focuses on transac-
tions likely to involve transfer pricing abuses, and (iii) a correlative
adjustment procedure that ensures that an upward adjustment in
one country will be reflected by a downward adjustment in other
countries affected by the transaction under audit.
(a) Monitoring Intra-Firm Commodity Transactions. A broad
monitoring system that compares prices of intra-firm commodity
transactions with world market prices could prove to be an effec-
tive deterrent against transfer pricing abuses by itself. If transna-
tional enterprises knew there was a good possibility of a transfer
price being reviewed, they would be more likely to make a good
faith effort to set the price by reference to the open market. An
effective monitoring system obviously requires current information
on world market prices. For this reason, a number of less devel-
oped countries have contracted with private monitoring organiza-
tions to compare invoice prices of intra-firm imports and exports
with "reference" prices obtained from various sources.7" In other
cases, governments obtain monitoring information themselves on
either a general or ad hoc basis with respect to specific enterprises
or economic sectors.
7 3
It should be noted that the need for information on world
market prices represents an area ripe for regional cooperation.
Clearly, it would be more cost effective if information on world
market prices were obtained by a regional body for dissemination
72. Nigerian imports, for example, are subject to inspection by the Societe Gbn~rale de
Surveillance (SGS), a Swiss company which checks to make certain goods are imported at
reasonable prices. C. IRISH, NIGERIA: TAXATION OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS ENGAGED IN
NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 18 (1983).
73. C. IRISH, INDONESIA, supra note 13, at 23-24; C. IRISH, BRAZIL, supra note 55, at 29;
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, supra note 9, at 18-21.
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among the member countries rather than by the countries individ-
ually. In addition, regional cooperation in the collection and appli-
cation of information on world market prices would provide a
method for more developed tax administrations to assist the less
developed tax administrations in the formulation of monitoring
procedures.
Of course, monitoring systems do have built in limitations.
First, because effective monitoring of intra-firm commodity prices
requires an established open market price, commodities with re-
spect to which there is no such price cannot be checked effectively
under a straight monitoring system. Second, it is not feasible and
probably unduly burdensome on legitimate business transfers to
check all intra-firm commodity transactions with every open mar-
ket price that exists. Hence, the monitoring systems developed
thus far have had significant gaps.74 On the other hand, it seems to
be well documented that the bulk of intra-firm transactions is usu-
ally accounted for by a relatively small number of enterprises;
thus, investigations limited to a relatively few enterprises and eco-
nomic sectors may be adequate to significantly discourage transfer
pricing abuses.7 5 In the United States, Brazil, and Mexico, govern-
ment authorities maintain statistical registers of the largest enter-
prises. These schedules show the levels of international trade, for-
eign exchange remittances by type of payment, sales volumes, total
assets, employment levels, declared profits, volume of local borrow-
ing, and foreign equity participation. Statistical information from
similar registers in less developed countries could be used to
pinpoint companies and transactions which need closer scrutiny. In
Greece, for example, during the first two years of operation, a sys-
tem aimed at curbing transfer pricing abuses scrutinized seventy-
five key products: the annual level of over-invoicing imports and
under-invoicing exports amounted to approximately $18.6 million
(U.S.). Similar results were reported in Colombia, where the prod-
ucts selected were largely imported pharmaceuticals and exports of
timber, fish, and some precious metals .7 It is worth noting that the
establishment of an advance clearance procedure within the moni-
toring system and the audit procedures described below would of-
fer transnational enterprises much more certainty in the transfer
74. PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, supra note 9, at 20-21.
75. C. VAITSOS, PROPOSALS FOR ESTABLISHING A SYSTEM OF CONTROL OVER TRANSFER
PRICING 14 (1978).
76. Id. at 14-15.
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pricing area. Under an advanced clearance procedure, a taxpayer
could apply for prospective review of an intra-firm transaction.
Having established an agreed transfer price, the taxpayer could
then proceed with the transaction without fear of a retroactive ad-
justment or audit and a controversy over the level of correlative
adjustments in other countries.
(b) Auditing Intra-Firm Commodity Transactions. The moni-
toring system should be complemented with an audit program to
review those commodity transactions which are not routinely
monitored such as transactions without established open market
prices. In general, the audit procedures should be structured to
check transfer prices by reference to open market prices or by us-
ing the resale price method, the cost-plus method, or other suitable
methods. Clearly, to be effective, the monitoring and audit systems
must have access to relevant information and make efficient use of
trained personnel.
Without relevant information on prices, costs, mark-ups, and
the like, no audit can be expected to yield anything other than an
arbitrary result. Ideally, tax administrators should be able to ob-
tain information about intra-firm transactions from at least five
sources. First, a source of information sometimes overlooked is the
tax administrator's own government.7 In most instances, several
different departments obtain information on the activities of trans-
national enterprises that could be relevant to monitoring transfer
prices. Customs officials, for example, have information on the de-
clared value of goods imported by the transnational enterprises.
Central banks generally have information on foreign exchange re-
ceipts and disbursements for exchange control purposes. There-
fore, tax administrators need to make certain they are making op-
timum use of information already available within their
government.
A second source of information is from within the home coun-
try in which the transnational enterprise is located, generally an
industrialized country. Sophisticated information gathering and
auditing techniques make industrialized countries an especially im-
portant source of information on the activities of their transna-
tional enterprises both at home and abroad. A major problem with
77. With respect to collecting relevant information, some commentators have noted
that it is surprising how limited the
resources and capabilities of some less developed country tax administrations are, even
where modest research would yield significant results. See, e.g., Lall, supra note 4, at 66.
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this source of information is that a bilateral tax treaty with an ex-
change of information provision is usually necessary to overcome
the "tax secrecy" legislation in the industrialized country. Al-
though there are some instances in which information is informally
exchanged between home and host countries, in most cases infor-
mation on specific taxpayers is available only under the exchange
of information provision of a bilateral tax treaty. In fact, access to
information from industrialized countries is one of the principal
reasons why less developed countries should consider concluding
bilateral tax treaties with industrialized countries, particularly
those countries where transnational enterprises reside. 8
Inter-governmental exchanges of tax information, particularly
between industrialized and less developed countries, could be
much more useful than they are at present. For this reason, the
U.N. Group of Tax Experts has devoted considerable attention to
the problem of inter-governmental exchanges of information. In its
Sixth Report, 9 the Group formulated extensive guidelines for bi-
lateral exchanges of information. The guidelines provide an inven-
tory of possible arrangements to be used and a commentary on
some of the factors relevant to the use of particular arrangements.
The guidelines constitute,
the fullest description, in documents of this nature, of the fac-
tors and techniques involved in exchange of information. The
material, moreover takes account of the interests and problems
of less developed countries as regards both the importance to
them of an adequate exchange of information and their ability
to participate in such an exchange."s
These guidelines thus represent an indispensable reference tool for
less developed countries desiring to make better use of bilateral
exchanges of information. One source of bilateral information is
tax administrators in industrialized countries which are host coun-
tries of transnational corporations. Thus, Canada, as the repository
of an enormous amount of U.S. foreign investment, should be able
to provide information gathered from a host country's perspective
on the activities of many U.S. transnational enterprises.
The simultaneous examination programs (SEP's) being used
by several of the industrialized countries could also provide a use-
78. Group of Experts, supro note 53, at 49-53.
79. SIXTH REPORT, supra note 70.
80. Group of Experts, supra note 53, at 50.
19861
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
ful model for bilateral cooperation between the home and host
countries.8' Under these programs, the accounts of a transnational
enterprise are concurrently audited by the tax authorities in two or
more jurisdictions. The SEP procedures are designed to reduce the
opportunities for undisclosed income or inconsistently reported
transactions. They also offer an opportunity to limit the number of
conflicting determinations unfavorable to the transnational enter-
prises."2 It is clear that participation in SEP's with industrialized
countries will give tax administrators in less developed countries
access to information and audit techniques they would not other-
wise have. Third, international and regional organizations and
treaty networks represent a largely untapped source of informa-
tion. The World Bank and U.N. Centre on Transnational Corpora-
tions have worked to gather information on world market prices.
An international or regional organization could also serve as a fo-
rum for discussing problems in international tax administration,
such as the use of bilateral exchange of information provisions to
curb the use of tax havens.8 3
Serious thought should also be given to concluding a multilat-
eral treaty for the exchange of information. The obstacles to such a
broad based multilateral treaty caused many of the members of
the U.N. Group of Tax Experts to label the idea as premature;8 4
but there is no doubt such a treaty would be an effective mecha-
nism for curbing tax avoidance. It is a widely held belief that,
The increasing seriousness of tax evasion and avoidance by
transnational corporations could not ... be properly tackled in
bilateral conventions only. The mere psychological effect of a
multilateral framework would in itself have an important im-
pact. Difficulties should, of course, be expected, but difficulties
alone are not a justification for lack of action.8
For this reason, there should be growing support for beginning pre-
paratory work on the conclusion of a multilateral convention for
the exchange of information. To implement the convention on a
continuing basis, a permanent body similar to the Customs Co-op-
81. Note, Taxation: Implementation of Simultaneous Auditing Procedures, 21 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 798 (1980).
82. Id. at 802.
83. S. GAFNY, POSSIBLE CONCLUSION OF A MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON THE EXCHANGE
OF INFORMATION CONCERNING DIRECT TAXATION U.N. Doc. ST/S6/AC.8/L.20 (1978).
84. SEVENTH REPORT, supra note 20, at 59.
85. S. GAFNY, supra note 83.
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eration Council could be established. The functions of such a body
would include the following:
(1) Formulation of clear procedures for the exchange of infor-
mation, as a matter of routine, at specific request, or on a discre-
tionary basis.
(2) Establishment of a central information center for the col-
lection of information and its distribution to the various compe-
tent authorities, in accord with the procedures formulated for this
purpose.
(3) Creation of machinery for mutual consultation between tax
administrators concerned with the exchange of information so as to
promote the exchange of technical know-how, to improve adminis-
trative procedures, and to develop more effective collection
techniques.
(4) Periodic meetings, on a continuing basis, between repre-
sentatives of the acceding countries, which could develop into a
permanent international forum in the field of direct taxation. Such
meetings would, in the first instance, deal with all aspects of the
problem of tax evasion and the measures called for in order to
combat it. Particular reference would be made to the broadest pos-
sible exchange of information and the development of mutual con-
sultation and administrative co-operation in matters concerned
with the elimination of tax evasion and joint studies of its various
aspects, the exchange of technical and administrative know-how,
and the recommendation of methods and policies whose adoption
might assist all acceding countries to combat tax evasion.
(5) Development of new methods and procedures for expedit-
ing the exchange of information, including direct visits by tax ad-
ministrators, setting up joint teams for the investigation of a par-
ticular taxpayer or a specific economic activity, and encouraging of
joint administrative action.
(6) Creation of a global approach to the problem of tax eva-
sion, as recommended in the Sixth Report of the Group of
Experts.8"
Given the reality that we are probably many years away from
the conclusion of a multilateral convention, less developed coun-
tries should consider executing regional conventions for the ex-
86. Id. See also U.N. DEP'T OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL COOPERA-
TION IN TAX MATTERS U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/12, (1984).
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change of information. Developing countries should look to ex-
isting examples of regional cooperation, such as the Nordic Group
of European countries and the European Economic Community. 7
A fourth source of information relevant to transfer pricing is
from published sources, especially in the home countries of the
transnational enterprises. A certain amount of balance-sheet data
usually is published by publicly traded corporations in their home
countries, and sometimes in their host countries. There also are
publications, such as Who Owns Whom, which list affiliated enter-
prises. With the advent of computerized information retrieval sys-
tems, such as Nexis, a great amount of information reported in
trade and financial journals now is easily obtained.
Finally, tax administrators can obtain information on local
and foreign activities of transnational enterprises from the enter-
prises themselves. Information on resale prices and the nature of
the activities of the reseller, costs of the seller, prices charged to
other subsidiaries and independent purchasers on comparable
transactions in other countries, and an explanation of how the
transnational enterprise arrived at the prices used in the transac-
tions being audited should be available from transnational
enterprises.
Of course, a major problem with obtaining information from
transnational enterprises is the practical reality that they are often
reluctant to divulge information about their foreign activities to
tax administrators, especially tax administrators in less developed
countries.8 8 Transnational enterprises frequently have been able to
forestall inquiries into foreign activities, however relevant such in-
quiries might be, because of their economic and political power in
the less developed countries. This may be changing, however, as
pressures mount in the international community for a code of con-
duct for transnational enterprises which includes expanded obliga-
tions on the disclosure of information. The OECD Guidelines for
Transnational Enterprises, for example, provide for the disclosure
of a wide range of information, a substantial amount of which
would be relevant to transfer pricing questions. As a result, the
international norm leans toward the disclosure of more informa-
tion, and if information becomes generally more available, transna-
tional enterprises should be less reluctant to supply such informa-
87. SEVENTH REPORT, supra note 20, at 60-61.
88. See Lall, supra note 4, at 67.
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tion to tax administrators in less developed countries.
Less developed countries can also overcome the reluctance of
transnational enterprises by formalizing their routine disclosure re-
quirements on a region-wide basis. With the collective power of an
entire region behind it, individual tax administrations should more
easily elicit compliance from transnational enterprises. Thus,
transnational enterprises, faced with somewhat harmonized dis-
closure requirements, will find that compliance is less onerous.
With respect to information obtained from transnational en-
terprises about their foreign activities, there is the obvious prob-
lem of ensuring that the information is authentic and accurate. If
the foreign activities are in a country where independent account-
ing firms routinely audit company accounts, a certification from an
accounting firm may be a sufficient guarantee of authenticity and
accuracy. If, however, independent audits are non-existent or not
sufficiently thorough to cover the information requested, then the
tax administrator could request verification by an accounting firm
chosen by him or his embassy in the foreign country.8 9
Obviously, an effective audit program requires the efficient use
of trained personnel. Given the acute shortage of properly qualified
persons in the tax administrations of many less developed coun-
tries, making efficient use of the few trained persons available is
doubly important for them. As indicated above, one way of using
personnel more efficiently is through cooperative audits. In recent
years, the United States and several other countries have an-
nounced cooperative audit programs with respect to taxpayers with
activities in both countries.90 If cooperative audits were conducted
on a regional basis it would reduce the duplicative work for both
the participating tax administrations and the transnational enter-
prise being audited. Region-wide audits would also introduce some
harmonization of audit procedures and allow more developed tax
administrations to assist the less developed tax administrations
through the audit process. Cooperative audits between the home
and host country of a transnational enterprise would offer the
same benefits, with possibly even greater assistance provided by
the home country to the host country. In addition, this would re-
duce the threat of double taxation as a result of inconsistent deter-
minations, and possibly eliminate the need for post audit correla-
89. Allocation of Income, supra note 22, at 438.
90. See Note, supra note 81.
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tive adjustments because adjustments could be made during the
audit process."
Tax secrecy laws will usually preclude cooperative audits un-
less there is a bilateral or regional tax treaty sanctioning such ex-
changes of tax information. Thus, the opportunity for cooperative
audits with the home countries of transnational enterprises may
represent another reason for less developed countries to selectively
enter into tax treaties with industrialized countries. The benefits of
cooperative audits also should encourage less developed countries
to work toward concluding a regional treaty on the exchange of
fiscal information.
(c) Correlative Adjustment Procedure. As indicated above, if
the home and host countries of a transnational enterprise cooper-
ate on transfer pricing audits, the need for post audit correlative
adjustments should be reduced because such adjustments can be
expected to be made during the actual audit process. On the other
hand, where the transfer pricing audit is carried on by the host
country alone, the legitimate interests of transnational enterprises
in avoiding double taxation can only be adequately safeguarded if
there is an effective correlative adjustment procedure that ensures
that an adjustment in the host country will be matched by an ap-
propriate adjustment in the home country. Without a correlative
adjustment procedure, the spectre of double taxation will give
transnational enterprises ample reason to resist efforts to curb
transfer pricing abuses in every imaginable way. With a correlative
adjustment procedure, tax administrators are in effect saying to
the transnational enterprises, "We recognize the inexactitude in-
herent in the transfer pricing process and we do not want to penal-
ize you just because your original transfer price differs from ours.
We do, however, want to ensure that the distribution of profits is
consistent with the arm's length approach." As a result of these
legitimate interests bring safeguarded, transnational enterprises
should be much more willing to accommodate the transfer pricing
monitoring and audit programs.
The prevailing view is that the correlative adjustment proce-
dure should be authorized and outlined in bilateral tax treaties.2
In general, the treaty provisions contemplate that a correlative ad-
justment will be made in one contracting state when the other con-
91. Id. at 802.
92. SixTH REPORT, supra note 70, at 4-5.
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tracting state makes an adjustment to reflect profits determined
under the arm's length approach. Thus, article 9 of the OECD 1977
Model Tax Convention specifically provides as follows:
2. Where a Contracting State includes in the profits of an enter-
prise of that State-and taxes accordingly-profits on which an
enterprise of the other Contracting State has been charged to
tax in that other State and the profits so included are profits
which would have accrued to the enterprise of the first-men-
tioned State if the conditions made between the two enterprises
had been those which would have been made between indepen-
dent enterprises, then that other State shall make an appropri-
ate adjustment to the amount of the tax charged therein on
those profits. In determining such adjustment, due regard shall
be had to the other provisions of this Convention and the com-
petent authorities of the Contracting States shall if necessary
consult each other.93
The guidelines of the U.N. Group of Tax Experts also contain a
similar provision.94 The correlative adjustment called for under ar-
ticle 9 is, however, not automatically required. Instead, it is to be
made only if the principal adjustment conforms to the arm's length
standard.95 In other words, article 9 does not seek to avoid a
double charge to tax which arises where the profits of one associ-
ated enterprise are increased to such a level where they exceed
what they would have been if they had been correctly computed on
an arm's length basis. The other state is committed to make an
adjustment of the profits of the affiliated company only if it con-
siders that the adjustment made in the first state is justified both
in principle and in amount.9 Therefore, to avoid conflicting deter-
minations with a correlative adjustment procedure, it may be nec-
essary for the competent authorities of the two contracting states
to consult as part of the adjustment process.
The correlative adjustment article and related provisions were
extensively discussed at the sixth meeting of the U.N. Group of
Tax Experts. In its Sixth Report, the U.N. Group set forth de-
tailed guidelines on correlative adjustment and mutual agreement
procedures. The Sixth Report should thus be essential reading for
tax administrators establishing correlative adjustment and mutual
93. OECD Model Double Taxation Convention of 1977, article 9, clause 2, in MODEL
INCOME TAX TREATIES (K. van Raad ed. 1983).
94. Group of Experts, supra note 53, at 54.
95. SIXTH REPORT, supra note 70, at 5.
96. Id.
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agreement procedures.
B. Indirectly: Apportionment of the Overall Profit of an
Enterprise
1. Selection
The principal attractions of the apportionment method are
that, in contrast to the complexities and uncertainties of the arm's
length approach, the apportionment method is simple to operate
and generally yields a predictable result. 7 In general, use of the
apportionment method requires only an established formula and
such figures as total profits of the enterprise, total sales, total pay-
roll, and sales and payroll within the taxing jurisdiction.
The simplicity and certainty of the apportionment method has
led to its fairly widespread acceptance and use. Most double taxa-
tion treaties, the OECD 1977 Model Tax Convention, and the U.N.
Tax Treaty Guidelines include the apportionment method as an
acceptable way to determine the profits attributable to permanent
establishments.9 8 A number of tax administrations already use ap-
portionment formulae as an alternative to or as a check on the
arm's length approach. For example, it is well known that, not-
withstanding its sophisticated staff, substantial disclosure require-
ments, and extensive guidelines under the arm's length approach,
the U.S. Internal Revenue Service in practice sometimes resorts to
the apportionment method in computing an inter-firm transfer
price." The apportionment method is also universally used by the
individual states of the United States to determine the taxable
profits of business enterprises with multi-state operations. 00 Even
some transnational enterprises, faced with the extremely arduous
if not impossible task of establishing transfer prices under the
arm's length approach, allocate costs of services under an appor-
tionment formula.10 1
The greatest problem with using the apportionment approach
97. See Tannenwald, supra note 40, at 650.
98. See U.N. DEP'T OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, GUIDELINES FOR TAX TREATIES
BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES at 29, U.N. Doe. STIESA/14, U.N. Sales
No. E74/XVI/5 (1974).
99. U.N. TAx TREATIES BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES-FIFTH RE-
PORT at 109, U.N. Sales No. E75/XVI/1 (1975)[hereinafter FIFTH REPORT].
100. See Tannenwald, supra note 40, at 650.
101. See SEVENTH REPORT, supra note 20, at 42.
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is the substantial risk of conflicting determinations which produce
over or under taxation of the total profits of the transnational en-
terprise. These conflicts can arise in three ways. First, if some of
the countries taxing the transnational enterprise determine intra-
firm transfer prices under the arm's length approach, while other
countries use the apportionment method, the results are likely to
be inconsistent. This is due to the fact that the former approach
seeks to approximate the open market, whereas the goal of the lat-
ter method is to establish a "proper" division of overall profits ir-
respective of how the marketplace would operate. Second, if all
countries taxing the transnational enterprise use the apportion-
ment method, conflicts would arise because of the lack of a uni-
form apportionment formula. Instead, as the experiences of the in-
dividual states of the United States make clear, tax jurisdictions
tend to adopt an apportionment formula that favors them as
against other taxing jurisdictions."0 2 Thus, if a country is a rela-
tively high wage country, it would be inclined to include labor
costs as a factor in its apportionment formula; other countries
might be inclined to favor other factors. The result would be that
although all countries used the apportionment method, each coun-
try would use a different apportionment formula with predictably
conflicting results. Third, even if all countries agreed to use a sin-
gle apportionment formula, conflicts could arise over the interpre-
tation of the various factors used in the formula. 0 3 For example, if
countries agreed that they would use a two factor apportionment
formula that gives equal weight to sales and labor costs, conflicts
could still arise as a result of different interpretations of the total
profits of the enterprise. Different interpretations could also center
upon the sales allocated to each jurisdiction-allocated in some in-
stances under a passage of title test, in other cases under a sub-
stantial connection test, and in still other cases on the basis of ulti-
mate use. Finally, different interpretations of labor costs could also
lead to conflicts because some jurisdictions allocate labor costs on
the basis of physical presence in the jurisdiction, and others allo-
cate according to the source of payments for the labor costs.
The problem of conflicting determinations under the appor-
tionment method should not, however, be overly exaggerated. In
fact, conflicting determinations are a major problem throughout in-
102. See Freud, Unitary Taxation Threat to the Multinationals, FIN. TIMES, July 14,
1978, at 16.
103. See TECHNICAL PAPERS, supra note 42, at 74-75.
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ternational taxation even without the use of the apportionment
method. Differing views on the concept of income, allowable de-
ductions, and jurisdictional rules, for example, make conflicting de-
terminations a common occurrence in international taxation. 10
Thus, conflicts are not unique with the apportionment method, al-
though they may be a greater problem where apportionment is
used.
Another major criticism of the apportionment method is the
enormous record keeping burden it imposes on foreign enterprises
who must translate their foreign economic activities into the local
currency of the host country. Many foreign based transnational en-
terprises have strongly objected to the record keeping burden
caused by the tax practices in California, Alaska, and elsewhere.'0 6
In these states, the net income attributable to them is determined
by applying an apportionment formula to the global net income of
the transnational enterprises and their affiliates. As a result, there
are significant costs associated with translating foreign capital, for-
eign sales, and foreign labor expenses into United States dollars.
Of course, the administrative burdens of the arm's length
standard are precisely why tax jurisdictions have moved to the ap-
portionment method. 06 Thus, when the burdens inherent in the
apportionment method are contrasted with the difficulties associ-
ated with determining an arm's length price (where there are no
comparable open market prices), the apportionment method will
usually emerge as the less burdensome procedure. It is probably
true, however, that under the arms length approach the adminis-
trative burden falls on the government (at least in the early stages
of a transfer pricing dispute), whereas under the formula appor-
tionment method the administrative burden falls more heavily on
the taxpayor.
Another drawback with the apportionment method is that it
occasionally produces unusual or undesirable results. If, for exam-
ple, a transnational enterprise is operating at a profit in one juris-
diction, but at a loss in all other jurisdictions, the apportionment
method would lead to a lack of taxable income in all of the juris-
dictions, including the profitable one. Alternatively, if the transna-
tional enterprise has an overall profit, but is operating at a loss in
104. See D. TILLINGHAST, TAX ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 11 (1984).
105. See generally Tannenwald, supra note 40.
106. Id. at 650.
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one or more jurisdictions, the apportionment method generally will
allocate some of the overall profits of the enterprise to the loss ju-
risdictions. Also, an apportionment formula that relies on such fac-
tors as labor costs and capital assets will produce relatively high
taxes on business activities with low profit margins and relatively
low taxes on business activities with high profit margins. Use of
other factors, such as gross sales, can produce similar distortions in
taxable profits. On the other hand, because the arm's length stan-
dard fails to account for the efficiencies of vertical or horizontal
integration enjoyed by transnational enterprises, an arm's length
transfer price determined by reference to the open market may
also produce anomalous results.
On balance, the benefits resulting from the ease of administra-
tion and certainty under an apportionment approach may out-
weigh the disadvantages of a greater risk of conflicting determina-
tions, the record keeping burdens, and the occasional anomalous
result. This is particularly so with respect to intra-firm transfers of
services and intangibles where use of the arm's length approach is
exceedingly complex and the result is essentially arbitrary. It is
therefore suggested that less developed countries consider making
greater use of the apportionment method in determining the
proper amount of profits attributable to services and intangibles
employed within their jurisdictions. At a minimum, the apportion-
ment method should be used to check results reached under the
arm's length approach to ensure that profits are not being allo-
cated disproportionately throughout the transnational
enterprise.10
7
2. Implementation
Given the spectre of a greater number of conflicting determi-
nations through the use of the apportionment method and the pos-
sibility of fewer opportunities for shifting profits through transfer
pricing, transnational enterprises will react with predictable hostil-
ity to the movement of less developed countries toward greater use
of the apportionment method. In fact, the transnational corpora-
tions' strenuous objections to use of the apportionment method in
California, Alaska, and elsewhere may stem as much from the ef-
fectiveness of the method to curb tax motivated transfer pricing
abuses as from the difficulties usually associated with the method.
107. See Lall, supra note 4, at 66.
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The fact that greater reliance on the apportionment method repre-
sents a departure from the theoretical norm of the arm's length
standard is also likely to engender some opposition. Consequently,
if greater use of the apportionment approach is not to act as a de-
terrent to foreign investment, less developed countries will have to
structure the apportionment method so that conflicting determina-
tions are minimized and the legitimate interests of transnational
enterprises are safeguarded.
Conflicting determinations would be minimized if there were
widespread agreement on a single apportionment formula that
could be employed by less developed countries with as little varia-
tion as possible. The three factor apportionment formula, with
which the individual states in the United States have had consid-
erable experience, should be an appropriate starting point.10 8 The
extensive guidelines and considerable experience gained by these
states over the last several decades could enable tax administrators
in less developed countries to avoid many of the administrative
problems and uncertainties they might otherwise encounter.
The experiences of the individual states in the United States
with the apportionment method in the late 1970s and early 1980s
makes -it clear, however, that the apportionment method is des-
tined to play only a limited role in efforts to curb transfer pricing
abuses in the near term. Transnational enterprises, especially for-
eign based enterprises, reacted very negatively to efforts to include
foreign economic activities in the apportionable base. In Florida,
Indiana, Colorado, and Oregon substantial economic pressures
were put on state policy makers to limit the inclusion of foreign
economic activities in the apportionable base.109 The pressures
were not unlike what a less developed country would encounter if
it were to move to wholesale adoption of an apportionment method
that took into account foreign as well as domestic economic activi-
ties,110 and, as occured in the varios states, the less developed
country would probably submit to these pressures.
As a result, in the short term, it would appear that less devel-
oped countries should use the apportionment method principally
108. See Miller, Worldwide Unitary Combination: The California Practice, in THE
STATE CORPORATE INCOME TAX 142 (C. McClure ed. 1983).
109. See S. DeCosse, California Unitary Taxation (Spring 1985) (unpublished manu-
script on file in the office of the author).
110. An apportionment method that took into account only domestic activities would,
in effect, be no different than the arm's length standard in most less developed countries.
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as a quiet method to make certain the more overt mechanisms for
dealing with transfer pricing abuses are working."' In some cases,
such as where the intra-firm transfers involve services or in-
tangibles, for which no comparable open market prices exist, the
apportionment method may be of more direct assistance. In other
instances, it probably is best left as a secondary mechanism to curb
transfer pricing abuses.
C. Indirectly: Posted or Notional Export Prices
The use of the posted or notional export prices in lieu of the
arm's length approach offers relative simplicity and certainty.
With a posted or notional export price system, the proper transfer
price is determined by simply applying an agreed fraction to the
open market price for specified finished goods. In addition, since
the relevant fraction is agreed to in advance of the actual intra-
firm transfers, both the transnational enterprise and the host
country will be able to determine the appropriate transfer price
prior to the actual transaction. Of course, almost by definition,
posted or notional export prices can only be used for exports of
primary commodities with respect to which there are established
open markets for the finished products. In addition, because the
relevant factors for determining a posted or notional export price
are established in negotiations between the government of the host
country and the transnational enterprise, it would appear that less
developed countries should consider using this approach only
where they are in a relatively strong bargaining position. As a con-
sequence, in their current form, posted or notional export prices
offer only a limited solution to the problem of transfer pricing.
Given the simplicity and certainty of operating under a posted
or notional export price system, less developed countries should
consider the expanded use of such a system. Some countries are
beginning to employ a parallel system to impute income to
purchasing and export activities within their territories. It also is
possible that posted or notional export prices could be used on a
regional basis and applied to a broader class of exports.
D. Indirectly: Elimination of Tax Differentials
Elimination of tax differentials would reduce abusive transfer
111. See Lall, supra note 4, at 66.
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pricing by removing the tax advantage of such practices. As men-
tioned above, tax differentials could be eliminated through the
adoption of a globally uniform tax rate. Given the existence of low-
or no-tax countries whose present prosperity is largely attributable
to their tax haven status, however, it is unrealistic to expect har-
monization of income tax rates even within the Western World.
The only practical way to eliminate tax differentials is for the
home countries of transnational enterprises to extend their tax ju-
risdiction to include all profits of transnational enterprises wher-
ever such profits arise, irrespective of whether they are earned by a
branch or a separately incorporated foreign subsidiary. This
change in the tax laws of the home countries of transnational en-
terprises would mean that all profits of the enterprises, including
profits attributable to foreign subsidiaries arising in tax haven ju-
risdictions, would be taxed currently in the home country irrespec-
tive of whether the profits are actually distributed to the parent.
Presumably, to avoid double taxation of such profits, the home
country would have to offer a tax credit for foreign taxes paid by
foreign subsidiaries. Inasmuch as some industrialized countries al-
ready have tax avoidance legislation that taxes foreign source prof-
its of foreign subsidiaries in certain instances, it does not appear to
be unrealistic to propose extending that legislation to include all
foreign source profits of foreign subsidiaries.
A major problem with legislation in industrialized countries
that seeks to tax foreign source profits of foreign subsidiaries is
that the extraterritorial effect of the legislation would intrude on
the domestic tax systems of all countries in which the foreign sub-
sidiaries are located. Thus, for example, fiscal incentives offered by
a less developed country to attract foreign investment would pro-
duce no tax benefit to transnational enterprises, but would simply
inure to the benefit of the treasury of the home country through a
reduced foreign tax credit.112 The inability to create favorable tax
differentials could be particularly worrisome to less developed
countries because of the perception that fiscal concessions such as
tax holding are one of the few ways less developed countries can
draw transnational corporations away from their traditional mar-
kets in industrialized countries and larger less developed countries.
112. Of course, this consequence of current taxation of foreign source profits of foreign
subsidiaries could be a blessing in disguise, as it would enable less developed countries to
terminate costly and often ineffective fiscal incentive programs without fear of discouraging
foreign investment.
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Another problem with current taxation of foreign source prof-
its of foreign subsidiaries is that it might not have a measurable
impact on transfer pricing abuses prompted by non-tax considera-
tions. The mechanisms to curb transfer pricing abuses- the arm's
length approach, the apportionment method, and use of posted or
notional export prices can be employed to curb transfer pricing
abuses motivated by non-tax as well as tax considerations. Thus,
any of the mechanisms discussed above could be employed to de-
tect transfer prices which are designed to circumvent exchange
control restrictions, to minimize reportable profits so as to reduce
the share paid to local participants, or to discourage competition.
Current taxation of foreign source profits of foreign subsidiaries,
however, only eliminates the tax reason for transfer pricing abuses.
As a consequence, even with current taxation of foreign source
profits of foreign subsidiaries, transfer pricing abuses may continue
to be a problem in those countries in which the abuses are
prompted by non-tax considerations. Since it appears that, often-
times in less developed countries, non-tax considerations may offer
a strong motive to manipulate transfer prices, the current taxation
of foreign source profits of foreign subsidiaries would not eliminate
transfer pricing abuses in less developed countries.
Less developed countries should nevertheless not automati-
cally oppose a move in industrialized countries to tax foreign
source profits of foreign subsidiaries. Of course, the less developed
countries might condition their support on a sharing of the in-
creased revenues from such taxes, especially since the increased
revenues will be largely attributable to previously untaxed profits
in low tax jurisdictions, many of which are less developed coun-
tries. In fact, in the face of industrialized countries taxing foreign
source profits of foreign subsidiaries, the less developed countries
could adopt a conscious policy of keeping their tax rates below the
rates of the industrialized countries. The combined effect of the
tax systems in the industrialized countries and less developed
countries would thus be to discriminate in favor of local enter-
prises in the less developed countries. At the same time, such a
policy would give the less developed countries a good basis for
claiming a share of the increased revenues obtained through the
taxation of foreign source profits of foreign subsidiaries.
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E. Indirectly: Taxation of Intra-Firm Transfer Payments,
Limits on the Deductibility of Such Payments, and Artificial Re-
strictions on Intra-Firm Transfer Payments
Source taxation of intra-firm transfer payments could effec-
tively reduce the tax incentives to engage in transfer pricing abuses
with respect to such payments. At present, most less developed
countries subject such payments to high withholding taxes in rec-
ognition that untaxed intra-firm royalty payments, rentals, inter-
est, and management service fees are very likely candidates for
transfer pricing manipulation."' In most cases, no distinction is
made between intra-firm payments and payments to unrelated
parties. There are, however, several problems with source taxation
of these payments. First, the controversy over the level of source
taxes on payments to related and unrelated parties has grown com-
mensurately with the importance and incidence of such pay-
ments."" The less developed countries have argued for higher
source taxes; the industrialized countries and transnational corpo-
rations have supported low source taxes or in the alternative, a
complete exemption for such payments."6 In recent years, the con-
troversy has been increasingly resolved in favor of the less devel-
oped countries because they have made a firm stand on their posi-
tion." 6 Consequently, fairly high withholding taxes on all royalty
payments, rentals, interest, and service fees are coming to be ac-
cepted as the international norm. Nonetheless, in a significant
number of less developed countries that have withholding taxes on
most remittances, the taxes are not actually collected on many in-
tra-firm payments. In some cases involving service fees, the exemp-
tion may follow an outdated policy of not taxing the fees unless the
person performing the services is physically present for a substan-
113. Gross withholding taxes of 15% to 20% or higher on royalties and management
service fees are commonplace in the Eastern Caribbean, South America, Africa, and many
parts of Asia. See CORPORATE TAXES, supra note 50.
114. THIRD SURVEY, supra note 5, at 42-46.
115. For a summary of the arguments for and against higher source taxes, see A.
NooTEBooM & J.H. TH. SCHIPPER, TAX TREATMENT OF THE REMUNERATION (ROYALTIES AND
LUMP SUMS) PAID BY ENTERPRISES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND
LICENSES UNDER PATENTS (1973); C. IRISH, AFRICAN COUNTRIES, supra note 18.
116. For example, the tax treaties recently concluded by the United States with Argen-
tina, Barbados, Egypt, and the Philippines all sanction historically high taxes on royalties
and/or management service fees. See Argentina Income Tax Treaty, 1 FED. TAX TREATIES
13, 101 (P-H 1986); Barbados Income Tax Treaty, 1 FED. TAX TREATIES 20, 101 (P-H 1986);
Egypt Income Tax Treaty, 1 FED. TAX TREATIES 34, 101 (P-H 1986); Phillipines Income
Tax Treaty, 3 FED. TAX TREATIES 74, 101 (P-H 1986).
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tial time in the host country or the services are attributable to a
"fixed based.""17 In other instances, the exemption may arise as a
government concession in the negotiations that led to the licensing
of technology, leasing of movable property, loans, or technical
assistance." 8
It is difficult to know how widespread this practice is, but
where it exists less developed countries should recognize that they
are sanctioning a practice through which substantial profits can be
artificially shifted abroad with only a minimal risk of detection. As
a result, it seems clear that less developed countries concerned
about transfer pricing abuses should strongly resist the efforts of
transnational corporations to obtain tax exempt status for such
payments. In any event, less developed countries should also recog-
nize that source taxation of intra-firm royalties and service fees
does not usually completely eliminate the tax differentials that at-
tract transfer price manipulation. In fact, only if the withholding
tax rate equals the generally applicable corporate tax rate-a situ-
ation that seldom exists-are tax differentials completely
eliminated." 9
As a corollary to withholding taxes on intra-firm payments,
some countries deny tax deductions to the paying entity.'2 0 The
net effect of denying deductibility is that the amount of the intra-
firm payment is subject to the regular corporate tax rate in the
host country. The problem with this approach is that if it is ap-
plied across the board to all external payments it probably will in-
hibit international trade and investment flows into the country. On
the other hand, if deductibility is denied only in the case of pay-
ments to related enterprises, then the tax administrators have to
be able to distinguish between payments to related parties and
payments to unrelated parties. Such a distinction may be difficult
to make and may result in discrimination against enterprises hav-
ing economic relations with foreign affiliates. Consequently, it
seems administratively preferable to permit deductions for intra-
117. See supra text accompanying note 53.
118. See C. IRISH, AFRICAN COUNTRIES, supra note 18, at 51-52.
119. A simple example will illustrate: If the generally applicable corporate tax is 40%
and the withholding tax rate is 15%, an intra-firm service payment overstated by 100 will
yield a tax benefit of 25 to the enterprise, assuming the payment is fully deductible by the
payor and not subject to any additional taxes in the home country of the recipient. Of
course, as the gap between the generally applicable corporate tax rate and withholding tax
rate narrows, so does the tax benefit.
120. See supra text accompanying note 55.
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firm payments, but to impose a generally applicable withholding
tax on them. 2 '
Reliance on generally applicable withholding taxes is counter-
balanced by the fact that such withholding taxes usually do not
completely eliminate the tax differentials that stimulate transfer
pricing manipulations. Denying deductibility of intra-firm pay-
ments, however, does eliminate the tax differentials and the con-
comitant incentive to engage in transfer pricing abuses. As a result,
at a minimum, less developed countries should expressly retain the
authority to deny the deductibility of intra-firm payments where it
appears the payments exceed normal commercial standards. 2'
A system of generally applicable withholding taxes can not be
readily extended to intra-firm transactions involving goods
whatever the merits of taxing intra-firm royalty payments, rentals,
interest, and service fees. The international norm is that where
goods are imported the source country should tax the foreign im-
porter only if the importer has a substantial presence, or a "perma-
nent establishment," in the source country. In addition, where a
permanent establishment does exist, it is generally accepted that
the profits of the permanent establishment should be taxed on a
net basis, after a deduction for the expenses incurred in the pro-
duction of income. The permanent establishment concept, how-
ever, can be easily manipulated to avoid the existence of a perma-
nent establishment in the source country. Source income taxes on
intra-firm transactions involving goods also are unlikely to be an
effective device to limit transfer pricing abuses because of the diffi-
culties associated with determining the net income of the perma-
nent establishments that do exist. Conversely, ad valorem customs
duties do counter the income tax benefits obtained from over-in-
voicing imports. Therefore, in addition to their other functions,
customs duties should be recognized as playing some role in inhib-
iting transfer pricing abuses involving imported goods.
The lack of a notable impact on transfer pricing abuses
prompted by non-tax considerations is another problem with
greater source taxation of intra-firm payments. Greater source tax-
121. Of course, tax administrators will always want to reserve the power to recharacter-
ize royalty payments service fees as in substance profit distributions, which should be taxed
as dividends. In such cases, the payments usually will be both non-deductible and subject to
a gross withholding tax.
122. Formula apportionment is probably the most effective mechanism to monitor
whether or not the payments deviate significantly from normal commercial practices.
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ation of transfer pricing payments is like the elimination of tax
differentials: it attacks the tax reasons for transfer pricing abuses,
but acts only to increase the cost of transfer pricing abuses which
are motivated by the desire to minimize local profits. As a conse-
quence, greater source taxation may not markedly reduce transfer
pricing abuses, where such abuses are occasioned by non-tax
considerations.
As indicated above, 123 some countries have significantly lim-
ited the extent to which remittances can be made. In Brazil and
Indonesia, for example, the remittance of royalties and service fees
above certain amounts is prohibited. Such a prohibition, if en-
forced, would clearly curb transfer pricing abuses involving royal-
ties and service fees. The negative impact on foreign investor confi-
dence in the host economy is likely to be so great, however, as to
limit the feasibility of this mechanism to the larger, more affluent
less developed countries.
IV. CONCLUSION
The preceding sections have established that transnational en-
terprises have many opportunities to engage in transfer pricing
manipulations because, of the large volume of intra-firm transac-
tions. 2 4 The limited empirical evidence on the level of transfer
pricing abuses suggests that transnational enterprises do make use
of the opportunities they have, so that profits properly attributable
to one jurisdiction actually do surface in another jurisdiction.125
As indicated in sections II and III, governments generally have
taken three approaches to dealing with transfer pricing abuses.
First, they have developed extensive guidelines to be used in the
determination of an arm's length price. 126 Second, they have di-
minished the importance of transfer pricing practices. They have
done this through unilateral measures in industrialized countries
aimed at eliminating tax differentials, 127 through the use of
formula apportionment and posted or notional export prices,"1 8
and through the restructuring of foreign investment participation
123. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 5-7.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 8-11.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 19-39.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 47-50.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 40-46.
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so that the host government's share of the profits is withdrawn in
kind as a portion of the aggregate production.'2 9 Third, the govern-
ments have imposed taxes on intra-firm transfer payments, denied
deductions to the payor of intra-firm payments, and in some in-
stances prohibited certain intra-firm transfers. 30
No one mechanism has been devised to effectively deal with
all transfer pricing abuses. Some, such as the arm's length guide-
lines and the use of posted or notional export prices could be effec-
tively used with certain transactions but not others. Similarly, the
mechanisms designed to eliminate tax differentials, tax intra-firm
transfers and deny tax deductions for intra-firm payments could
be effective to curb tax motivated transfer pricing abuses, but may
not be effective against abuses prompted by non-tax considera-
tions. In addition, some of the mechanisms may not be appropriate
or feasible for the governments of less developed countries. In-
cluded in this category are the unilateral measures of the industri-
alized countries to eliminate tax differentials and the absolute
prohibitions on certain intra-firm payments imposed by some of
the larger, more affluent less developed countries.
To deal effectively with transfer pricing abuses, less devel-
oped countries will have to apply a range of mechanisms specially
tailored to deal with their particular intra-firm transactions. Some
specific suggestions, arranged by the type of transaction, are set
forth below.
Imports of Goods
Transfer pricing abuses involving imports of goods can be best
dealt with through a monitoring and auditing system designed to
provide information on open market prices and to compare the
open market prices with intra-firm prices. Empirical studies on the
nature of intra-firm trade in goods have established that in a great
many instances the trade is confined to only a few products. As a
result, the monitoring and auditing system need not concern itself
with the entire panoply of imports, but only with the few goods
that are imported from foreign affiliates in such volume as to cre-
ate opportunities for manipulating profits. An effective monitoring
and audit system, at minimum, therefore, must have information
129. See supra text accompanying note 58.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 49-57.
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about the nature of imports of the larger, foreign owned enter-
prises. Only in this way can the monitoring and auditing system be
sufficiently focused to be effective.
The countervailing impact of customs duties should be taken
into account where imports of goods are involved. If the duty on a
finished good is one hundred percent (ad valorem) and the regular
corporate tax rate is forty percent, a transnational enterprise will
not have a tax incentive to over-invoice that finished good. If, how-
ever, the goods are imported components or capital goods, which
often are duty free or taxed at only nominal rates, the transna-
tional enterprise will have a tax reason to over-invoice.
It would appear that the less developed countries could effec-
tively complement their monitoring and auditing system by quietly
using the formula apportionment method as a rough guide to rela-
tive profitability both in their country and elsewhere. If formula
apportionment indicates that a transnational enterprise should be
more profitable in the host country than the tax returns indicate,
the government probably should pay even closer attention to that
enterprise's accounts.
Obviously, both the monitoring and auditing system and the
formula apportionment method require access to relevant informa-
tion. The less developed countries use much less information than
is available in today's environment: information from within the
governments of the less developed countries, from the governments
of industrialized countries, from international agencies such as the
World Bank or the U.N. Centre on Transnational Corporations,
from published sources (especially computerized information re-
trieval systems such as Nexis), and from the transnational enter-
prises themselves. 31
It should be noted that a monitoring and auditing system
aimed at determining arm's length prices complemented with the
selective use of formula apportionment should effectively curb
transfer pricing abuses involving imports of goods, irrespective of
the reasons for the abuses. Hence, transfer pricing abuses
prompted by the desire to circumvent exchange control restrictions
should be as detectable as abuses prompted by tax considerations.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 77-89.
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Imports of Services and Intangibles
Imports of services and intangibles should also be covered by
the monitoring and auditing system described above. If open mar-
ket prices for the services or intangibles exist, an effort should be
made to identify them. In addition, charges for services and in-
tangibles should be examined to make certain there is no double
charging and that the services and intangibles actually benefit the
payer.
The difficulties associated with determining an open market
price where services or intangibles are involved limits the utility of
the monitoring and auditing system. High withholding taxes on
management service fees, interest payments, rents, and royalties is
the more effective way of dealing with transfer pricing abuses of
this kind. Imposition of the taxes on intra-firm transactions should
not inhibit international trade or investment flows-as long as the
taxes are part of a generalized scheme for withholding taxes on
passive income remittances-because such taxes are becoming
commonplace. To minimize administrative problems in character-
izing payments for services, interest, rents or royalties, it is sug-
gested the withholding taxes all be set at a single rate of approxi-
mately twenty percent.
Simply taxing such payments will not eliminate the incentive
to engage in transfer pricing manipulations, as long as the with-
holding tax rates are less than the generally applicable corporate
tax rate. Therefore, in addition to taxing payments for service fees
and royalties, less developed countries should use the formula ap-
portionment method as a quiet check on relative profitability.
Where the use of formula apportionment suggests that an enter-
prise should be much more profitable, that country should examine
the accounts of the enterprise very closely and consider denying
the deductibility of intra-firm payments unless an adequate expla-
nation for the different profitability levels is forthcoming. It should
be recognized that taxing intra-firm transfer payments and deny-
ing the deductibility of such payments only attacks the tax reasons
for engaging in transfer pricing abuses. As a result, these mecha-
nisms may not effectively curb transfer pricing abuses prompted
by non-tax considerations; they may only have the effect of in-
creasing the costs of the abusive practices.
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Exports
The monitoring and auditing system complemented by a selec-
tive use of formula apportionment as a check on profitability
should also be somewhat effective in dealing with transfer pricing
abuses involving exports. In addition, where primary products are
involved, some countries have used posted or notional export
prices which are set as a proportion of a downstream price for
processed goods if the downstream price was easily ascertained in
the open market. In such cases, the transfer prices actually used do
not affect reported profits for tax purposes, although they may af-
fect the foreign exchange flows and reportable profits for non-tax
purposes. Some countries have diminished the importance of
transfer prices with respect to exports by withdrawing their share
of the profits in kind, as a proportion of the commodity being ex-
ported. In order for this device to be effective, however, the host
government must have either an internal use for the commodity,
such as oil and natural gas, or an independent means of disposing
of the commodity on the open market.
A concluding question is whether the program outlined above
for dealing with transfer pricing abuses will have a negative impact
on transnational enterprises: whether it will drive transnational en-
terprises to countries with more sanguine transfer pricing policies.
As indicated earlier,"' it is a difficult question and the answer de-
pends in part on the overall impression transnational enterprises
have of a particular country. If a country plays a marginal role in
the activities of transnational enterprises and the activities are eas-
ily transportable, the introduction of major mechanisms to deal
with transfer pricing abuses may prompt the enterprises to go else-
where. It seems likely, however, that the greatest negative impact
will be on those enterprises which are contributing only marginally
to the local economy. If the enterprises are enjoying tax holidays,
making use of factory shells put up by the local government, and
employing only a few indigenous personnel, they may be quite mo-
bile. On the other hand, if the enterprises have substantial, long-
term investments in fixed assets and trained labor forces, and the
program to deal with transfer pricing abuses is packaged as part of
an overhaul of the government which is intended to improve the
effectiveness and responsiveness of the government, then the entire
package may be applauded rather than condemned.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 14-18.
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At a minimum, if a less developed country is going to embark
on a program to combat transfer pricing abuses, the government
must make clear to the transnational enterprises that their legiti-
mate interests will be carefully safeguarded. This means that the
government will have to explicitly recognize that the establishment
of an appropriate transfer price in a great many intra-firm transac-
tions is a difficult, highly discretionary matter. Hence, evil intent
should not be presumed, de minimis adjustments should be
avoided, and adequate safeguards to avoid double taxation should
be a central part of the program.
